

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ANA C.-M.,

Plaintiff,

v.

Civil Action No.
3:20-CV-0296 (DEP)

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,¹

Defendant.

APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

FOR PLAINTIFF

LACKMAN GORTON LAW FIRM
P.O. Box 89
1500 East Main St.
Endicott, NY 13761-0089

PETER A. GORTON, ESQ.

FOR DEFENDANT

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN.
625 JFK Building
15 New Sudbury St
Boston, MA 02203

MOLLY CARTER, ESQ.

¹ Plaintiff's complaint named Andrew M. Saul, in his official capacity as the Commissioner of Social Security, as the defendant. On July 12, 2021, Kilolo Kijakazi took office as the Acting Social Security Commissioner. She has therefore been substituted as the named defendant in this matter pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and no further action is required in order to effectuate this change. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

DAVID E. PEEBLES
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ORDER

Currently pending before the court in this action, in which plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(3)(c), are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings.² Oral argument was heard in connection with those motions on July 14, 2021, during a telephone conference conducted on the record. At the close of argument, I issued a bench decision in which, after applying the requisite deferential review standard, I found that the Commissioner’s determination resulted from the application of proper legal principles and is supported by substantial evidence, providing further detail regarding my reasoning and addressing the specific issues raised by the plaintiff in this appeal.


After due deliberation, and based upon the court’s oral bench decision, which has been transcribed, is attached to this order, and is

² This matter, which is before me on consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), has been treated in accordance with the procedures set forth in General Order No. 18. Under that General Order once issue has been joined, an action such as this is considered procedurally, as if cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings had been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby

ORDERED, as follows:

- 1) Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED.
- 2) The Commissioner's determination that the plaintiff was not disabled at the relevant times, and thus is not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act, is AFFIRMED.
- 3) The clerk is respectfully directed to enter judgment, based upon this determination, DISMISSING plaintiff's complaint in its entirety.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David E. Peebles", is written over a horizontal line.

David E. Peebles
U.S. Magistrate Judge

Dated: July 23, 2021
Syracuse, NY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-----X
ANA C.-M.,

Plaintiff,

vs.

3:20-CV-296

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.
-----X

Transcript of a **Decision** held during a
Digitally-Recorded Telephone Conference on July 14,
2021, the HONORABLE DAVID E. PEEBLES, United States
Magistrate Judge, Presiding.

A P P E A R A N C E S

(By Telephone)

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1 (The Court and all counsel present by
2 telephone, 2:16 p.m.)

3 THE COURT: All right. Let me begin by thanking
4 both of you for excellent presentations, you presented me
5 with quite an interesting complex case with a wealth of
6 medical and expert opinion evidence contained in the
7 administrative transcript.

8 I have before me a challenge to the Commissioner's
9 determination finding that plaintiff was not disabled at the
10 relevant times and therefore ineligible for the benefits
11 which she sought. The challenge is brought pursuant to 42
12 United States Code Section 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).

13 The background is as follows: Plaintiff was born
14 in June of 1966 and is currently 55 years of age. She stands
15 5 foot 4 inches in height and has at various times weighed
16 between 166 and 199 pounds. Plaintiff is divorced. She has
17 children who live in Puerto Rico with their father. The
18 plaintiff moved from Puerto Rico approximately three years
19 ago and has lived in New Jersey and more recently in
20 Binghamton or the Binghamton area in various apartment
21 settings. At points she was living alone, at other times she
22 was living with a granddaughter. Plaintiff has a GED and
23 while in school in Puerto Rico attended regular classes. She
24 also has a certification in the area of phlebotomy.
25 Plaintiff is right-handed. She has, is equivocal as to

1 whether she has a driver's license, at one point it was
2 suspended. Plaintiff stopped working sometime in 2011. Her
3 past positions have included as a retail clerk, a private
4 security guard, a child care assistant, a bus aide, a
5 laborer, an airline or airplane cleaner, and self-employed as
6 a hair stylist. Beginning in October of 2019, plaintiff
7 began being paid approximately 18 to 39 hours per week to
8 care for her mother and that position included various other
9 tasks including cleaning house.

10 Physically, plaintiff suffers from degenerative
11 disk disease of the lumbar spine, a right knee meniscal tear,
12 status post surgery repair which occurred in December of
13 2016, asthma, a bilateral foot disorder, described as plantar
14 fascial fibromatosis, an obstructive sleep apnea condition,
15 headaches, and peripheral neuropathy of the lower
16 extremities, and diabetes. She has also had a cochlear
17 hearing transplant surgery on her left ear in June of 2009
18 and her right ear in June of 2010. She's had multiple foot
19 surgeries, the latest of which was 2017, she underwent a
20 laminectal discectomy of the L3-L4 region in September of
21 2015, as I indicated, right knee surgery in December of 2016.
22 She reports having been struck as a pedestrian by a car in
23 2003, leading to some of the physical conditions. She was
24 also attacked by dogs at one point.

25 Mentally plaintiff suffers from depression, bipolar

1 disorder, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, and major
2 depressive disorder. One of the causes for her mental health
3 condition was the murder of her son in June of 2012. She has
4 undergone no psychiatric hospitalization. There is some
5 evidence that at some point she underwent counseling
6 approximately one time per month.

7 Plaintiff has seen multiple doctors over time. Her
8 general practitioner was a nurse practitioner, Scott Rosman.
9 She has also seen orthopedic surgeon Dr. Eric Seybold. She
10 has seen Dr. Anne Calkins for her back and pain management,
11 Dr. Zia Shah, a pulmonologist, Dr. Brandy Benjamin,
12 Dr. Robert Webster, a psychiatrist, Dr. James Hogan, a
13 podiatrist, Dr. Ahmed Shoaib, described as a primary
14 physician, Dr. James Vincens, Licensed Clinical Social Worker
15 Kyle Webb, Nurse Practitioner Amy Cron, and Dr. Khaula
16 Rehman, a psychiatrist she saw on two occasions.

17 In terms of activities of daily living, plaintiff
18 is able to bathe, dress, cook, clean, shop, do laundry, care
19 for her granddaughter and her mother, attend school. She
20 apparently tried to take a medical assistant's course at
21 Elmira Business Institute but left school reportedly to care
22 for her mother. She is able to use a computer, travel, shop,
23 walk, socialize with friends, attend medical appointments,
24 watch television, she does not like to take public
25 transportation but does on occasion. The evidence is

1 equivocal as to whether she smokes. She reportedly quit but
2 may be using E-cigarettes. At one point she was smoking
3 three packs of cigarettes per day. She is also a past user
4 of heroin and crack cocaine.

5 This case has a relatively tortured procedural
6 history. Plaintiff previously filed six applications for
7 benefits, the most recent prior to this application was
8 denied in March of 2012. On February 28, 2013, she filed an
9 application for Title II and Title XVI benefits, alleging an
10 onset date of May 1, 2011. There were subsequent
11 applications on August 28, 2015 and December 6, 2017. Those
12 applications, the three of them were consolidated for
13 consideration at some point in this case.

14 There have been eight administrative hearings
15 conducted to address plaintiff's various claims in the
16 record. Several relate to the prior application, including
17 June 21, 2007, November 5, 2007, October 9, 2009.
18 December 23, 2012 was a hearing addressing the current
19 applications before Richard DeStefano. There was a hearing
20 on October 2, 2014 before Barry Ryan, July 30th, 2015 before
21 ALJ Barry Ryan, and October 11, 2017 hearing before Judge
22 Elizabeth Koennecke, and another before that same ALJ on
23 November 26, 2019. There were three administrative law judge
24 decisions addressing the current applications, the first from
25 Barry Ryan in August of 2015. That resulted in a consent

1 remand when action was commenced in a District Court. The
2 remand occurred on February 1, 2017 and it resulted in a
3 decision from the Social Security Administration Appeals
4 Council on May 7, 2019, vacating the earlier decision and
5 remanding. A second ALJ decision was issued on November 3,
6 2017 by Administrative Law Judge Elizabeth Koennecke. That
7 ultimately resulted in a reversal by United States Magistrate
8 Judge Thérèse Wiley Dancks on March 11, 2019. ALJ Koennecke
9 issued a third decision on January 7, 2020, which became a
10 final determination of the agency, after 60 days. This case
11 was commenced on March 16, 2020, and is timely.

12 In her decision, ALJ Koennecke painstakingly
13 recounts the medical evidence in the case and the reasons for
14 her decision. She also addresses earlier decisions and is
15 somewhat exercised over having been reversed apparently, but
16 I will say before I address her opinion, I do agree with
17 Mr. Gorton that quantity does not equal quality, but in this
18 case the decision is comprehensive and, as you will see, I
19 think supported.

20 The administrative law judge in her decision
21 indicated first that plaintiff was last insured on
22 December 31, 2012.

23 At step one, she found that plaintiff had not
24 engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 1, 2011,
25 the alleged onset date. She did acknowledge that plaintiff

1 was hired to care for her mother and paid and while she did
2 not consider that substantial gainful activity, she did take
3 it into account when addressing the residual functional
4 capacity of the plaintiff.

5 At step two, ALJ Koennecke found that plaintiff
6 suffers from severe impairments that impose more than minimal
7 limitations on her ability to perform work-related functions,
8 basic work-related functions including a mental impairment
9 that was variously characterized over time, asthma or
10 emphysema, obstructive sleep apnea, degenerative disk disease
11 of the lumbar spine, small meniscal tear of the right knee
12 status postsurgical repair of right knee, and a bilateral
13 foot disorder.

14 At step three, she concluded that plaintiff's
15 conditions do not meet or medically equal any of the listed
16 presumptively disabling conditions set forth in the
17 regulations and she considered quite a few listings
18 addressing both the mental and the physical limitations and
19 conditions experienced by the plaintiff.

20 ALJ Koennecke next concluded that notwithstanding
21 her impairments, plaintiff is capable of performing sedentary
22 work with exceptions related primarily but not exclusively
23 to, I should say primarily but not exclusively to her mental
24 condition because one could argue that the regularly attend
25 to a routine and maintain a schedule has physical and mental

1 components to it.

2 Applying that RFC finding with the assistance of
3 testimony from a vocational expert, ALJ Koennecke concluded
4 that plaintiff is capable of performing her past relevant
5 work as a hair braider and therefore concluded, without
6 addressing step five, that plaintiff was not disabled at the
7 relevant times.

8 As you know, the court's function in this case is
9 extremely limited. I must determine whether correct legal
10 principles were applied and the resulting determination is
11 supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence
12 being defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
13 would find sufficient to support a conclusion. The Second
14 Circuit has noted in *Brault v. Social Security Administration*
15 *Commissioner*, 683 F.3d 443 from June of 2012 that this is an
16 extremely deferential and stringent standard. In *Brault*, the
17 court also noted that under the substantial evidence
18 standard, once an ALJ finds a fact, that fact can be rejected
19 only if a reasonable fact finder would have to conclude
20 otherwise.

21 Plaintiff raises essentially four arguments in
22 support of her challenge to the determination. She argues
23 that it was error not to credit Dr. Hogan's opinions as an
24 acceptable medical source and a treating source.

25 Secondly, she argues that the ALJ substituted her

1 judgment for medical opinions and wrapped into that is a
2 failure to include a sit/stand option into the residual
3 functional capacity finding.

4 The third relates to the failure to properly
5 analyze plaintiff's mental limitations and focus on
6 semi-skilled work in the face of Dr. Loomis' opinion of
7 April 4, 2013 at page 704 to the effect that plaintiff
8 suffers from marked impairments in maintaining attendance and
9 concentration.

10 And fourth, she argues that she is not able to
11 perform her past relevant work because of her deficits in
12 concentration, work pace and attendance.

13 I will note that notwithstanding Judge Dancks'
14 order to the contrary, I did read and consider plaintiff's
15 reply brief in addressing this case.

16 The first argument relates to opinions of Dr. Hogan
17 who has issued several reports suggesting that over time
18 plaintiff's foot conditions have worsened, citing 3022, 3023,
19 3024, and 2939 of the administrative record. Dr. Hogan has
20 given various opinions concerning plaintiff's ability to walk
21 and stand and the need to elevate feet. In March of 2015, he
22 opined that plaintiff can stand only two out of eight hours
23 and must elevate her feet 25 percent of the time. At another
24 point, he opined that plaintiff can only walk or stand for
25 five minutes out of each hour. Dr. -- as the Commissioner

1 concedes, Dr. Hogan as a podiatrist does qualify as an
2 acceptable medical source under the regulations which were in
3 effect at the time of plaintiff's application. And so, as a
4 treating physician, his opinions regarding the nature and
5 severity of plaintiff's impairment normally would be entitled
6 to considerable deference, if supported by medically
7 acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and
8 not inconsistent with other substantial evidence. His
9 opinions, however, are not necessarily controlling if they
10 are contrary to other substantial evidence in the record,
11 including opinions of other medical experts. And of course,
12 under such cases as *Veino v. Barnhart*, 312 F.3d 578, Second
13 Circuit 2002, it is for the administrative law judge to
14 resolve any conflicts in the medical evidence.

15 In this case, Dr. Hogan's opinions were discussed
16 by Administrative Law Judge Koennecke at 1931 of the
17 administrative transcript and they were given little weight.
18 And ALJ Koennecke explained why. Despite Dr. Hogan stating
19 that plaintiff's condition worsened, at the hearing plaintiff
20 claims that her condition remained the same. She also
21 explained that the opinions are inconsistent with plaintiff's
22 activities of daily living, including her ability to attend
23 school and care for her mother. She discussed inconsistent,
24 the fact that the opinions were inconsistent with findings at
25 page 1932, and erroneously, as we said, at page 1935 treated

1 Dr. Hogan as not an acceptable medical source.

2 I have reviewed the treatment of Dr. Hogan's
3 opinions in the context of and considering him as a treating
4 source, and although there was not the rote discussion of the
5 *Burgess* factors, which include length of treatment
6 relationship and frequency of examination, nature and extent
7 of the treatment relationship, the degree to which the
8 medical source has supported his or her opinion, the degree
9 of consistency between the opinion and the record as a whole,
10 whether the opinion is given by a specialist, and other
11 evidence as set forth in both *Burgess* and 20 C.F.R. Section
12 404.1527 and 416.927, I do find that several of those have
13 been -- were specifically addressed, and relying on *Estrella*
14 *v. Berryhill*, 925 F.3d 90, Second Circuit 2019, I find that a
15 searching review of the record fails to disclose any
16 violation of the treating source rule when it comes to
17 Dr. Hogan's opinion. To the extent that she was in error in
18 treating him as a treating source, I find the error is
19 harmless, and there would be no useful purpose served in
20 remanding for consideration of Dr. Hogan's opinions and
21 treatment as a treating source. *Lugo v. Commissioner of*
22 *Social Security*, 2017 WL 4005621 from the Northern District
23 of New York, September 11, 2017. So I find no error in
24 response to point number one.

25 In terms of the analysis of medical opinions,

1 there's a wealth of information in this record. I didn't
2 count them up but we have medical source statements from
3 multiple individuals addressing both the physical and mental
4 impairments of the plaintiff. Dr. A. Periakaruppan issued
5 opinions on March 1, 2018, that's at 2034 to 2036, and
6 March 5, 2018, 2850 to 2851, discussed and given some weight
7 by the administrative law judge at 1929 to 1930 and again at
8 1935.

9 Dr. Gilbert Jenouri, an examining consultant,
10 issued reports on April 4, 2013, 706 to 710, November 17,
11 2016, 3098 to 3101, and February 14, 2018, 2843 to 2846,
12 given some weight by the administrative law judge. She
13 discussed those opinions at 1930 and 1935.

14 Dr. Hogan, we've addressed, issued many opinions.
15 They were discussed by the administrative law judge at 1931,
16 1932 and given little weight.

17 Dr. Eric Seybold issued opinions at -- on June 16,
18 2016, that's at 824 to 825, discussed and given little weight
19 at 1932, 1935, 1940, and 1942.

20 Dr. Ahmed Shoaib issued an opinion on September 4,
21 2014 at pages 759 to 760, discussed and given little weight
22 at 1914, 1931 to 1932, 1935, 1940, and 1942.

23 Dr. Anne Calkins issued a report, or opinions on
24 October 11, 2017, October 18, 2019, May 11, 2019 at 3067 to
25 3071 and 2432, given little weight and discussed at 1931,

1 1935, 1940, and 1942.

2 Dr. Echevarria issued an opinion on June 6, 2013
3 finding no evidence of a disorder. 174 to 180. On the
4 mental side of things -- and Dr. Echevarria actually
5 addressed the mental as well.

6 Dr. M. Juriga, psychologist, issued an opinion, a
7 nonexamining psychologist, February 22, 2018, at 2036, 2039,
8 given some weight 1937.

9 Dr. Khaula Rehman issued an opinion on May 15,
10 2019, I noted that she only saw the plaintiff twice. That
11 was reported at 2944 to 2945. It was given some weight but
12 not great weight, discussed at 1939 to 1942.

13 Dr. Mary Ann Moore issued an opinion, a
14 consultative examiner, on February 14, 2018 at 2835 to 2840,
15 given some weight but not great weight, 1938.

16 Dr. T. Harding, state agency consultant, at 2055 to
17 2068, given some weight, discussed at 1937.

18 LCSW Kyle Webb, July 8, 2015, it was found at 952
19 to 953. Nurse Practitioner Amy Cron and LCSW Webb issued an
20 opinion on March 2, 2015, 836 to 838, given little weight,
21 1940, 1942.

22 Dr. Robert Webster, September 3, 2014, 757 to 758,
23 given little weight, 1940, 1942.

24 Dr. Cheryl Loomis, consultative examiner, April 4,
25 2013, 702 to 705, given great weight and discussed at 1936.

1 Dr. Echevarria, June 6, 2013, 160 to 171, and again
2 174 to 186, given some weight, 1937.

3 And lastly, Dr. Amanda Slowik, another examining
4 psychologist I believe, that was from November 17, 2016, it
5 appears at 3105 to 3110, given some weight but not great
6 weight, 1938.

7 The focus of the attack on the weight of the
8 evidence is on both the off-task and absence portion based on
9 Dr. Shoaib, Dr. Seybold, and Dr. Calkins, and the requirement
10 of elevating feet, Dr. Hogan. That's the physical.

11 On the mental side, plaintiff points to marked
12 impairment to attention and concentration from Dr. Slowik,
13 moderate limitation in concentration and pace, Dr. Moore, and
14 off-task and absences from Dr. Slowik, Dr. Loomis,
15 Dr. Webster, Nurse Practitioner Cron, and LCSW Webb,
16 Dr. Moore, and Dr. Juriga.

17 It is for the administrative law judge, as pivotal
18 of course to the determination, to affix the plaintiff's
19 residual functional capacity, or RFC, which is defined as a
20 range of tasks she is capable of performing notwithstanding
21 her impairments. Ordinarily an RFC represents a claimant's
22 maximum ability to perform sustained work activities in an
23 ordinary setting on a regular and continuing basis, meaning
24 eight hours a day, for five days a week or an equivalent
25 schedule. And of course an RFC determination is informed by

1 consideration of all of the relevant medical and other
2 evidence and must be, like anything else, supported by
3 substantial evidence to withstand scrutiny.

4 On the physical side, the RFC determination,
5 clearly there's conflicting evidence. There's something in
6 those medical opinions for everyone. The physical side is
7 supported by Dr. Jenouri and Dr. Periakaruppan which were
8 relied on by the administrative law judge. It's well
9 established that consultative opinions can override a
10 treating source's opinion. *James C. v. Commissioner of*
11 *Social Security*, 2020 WL 6445907, Northern District of
12 New York, November 3, 2020.

13 On the mental side, the RFC says semi-skilled work
14 but the vocational expert clearly considered the position as
15 both generally performed and as the plaintiff performed it
16 and concluded that plaintiff is capable of performing it if
17 limited to simple instructions and tasks. That occurs at
18 1063 to 1064, and that finding or that -- the plaintiff's
19 ability in that regard is supported by the opinions of
20 Dr. Echevarria, plaintiff's activities of daily living, the
21 the opinion of Dr. Loomis, the opinion of Dr. T. Harding,
22 Dr. Moore, and Dr. Juriga.

23 The plaintiff is asking this court to reweigh the
24 medical evidence which of course, under *Veino*, would be
25 improper.

1 Focusing specifically on off-task and absenteeism,
2 Drs. Echevarria, Harding, Juriga, and Periakaruppan are state
3 agency consultants that found that, notwithstanding
4 plaintiff's physical and mental limitations, she is able to
5 perform work. I know that the POMS, the argument that the
6 Commissioner raises is that under the POMS, those consultants
7 were charged with determining whether plaintiff can perform
8 on a sustained basis and adhere to a schedule, and although
9 the POMS are not binding on the court, they are, they provide
10 context because I think from those opinions you can infer
11 that those state agency consultants concluded plaintiff is
12 able to perform on a sustained basis and meet a schedule.
13 The administrative law judge also relied to some degree on
14 Dr. Rehman's opinions, that's found at 1939. Under *Veino*,
15 it's for the ALJ to resolve conflicts. There clearly is
16 conflict in the record. The ALJ did not rely solely on her
17 lay opinion to reject medical opinions. She explains
18 specifically in fairly significant detail why neither the
19 mental nor physical impairments precluded plaintiff's ability
20 to maintain a schedule. Substantial evidence supports that
21 determination, and I note, by the way, that it is perfectly
22 proper for an administrative law judge to scrutinize whether
23 medical evidence supports an opinion, 20 C.F.R. Sections
24 404.1527(c)(2) and (3) and 416.927(c)(2) and (3).

25 In terms of the sit/stand option, Dr. Jenouri three

1 times and Dr. Periakaruppan's opinion support the lack of
2 need for -- to alter positions. Dr. Jenouri found that
3 plaintiff was moderately limited in standing, sitting,
4 walking, sitting. Dr. Periakaruppan indicated that plaintiff
5 could sit, stand, and walk six hours with normal breaks.
6 Those limitations are not inconsistent with sedentary work
7 with normal breaks. *Raymond C. v. Commissioner of Social*
8 *Security*, 2020 WL 42814, Northern District of New York,
9 January 3, 2020. And in his opinion in that case, Chief
10 Judge Glenn T. Suddaby cites other cases that support that
11 proposition.

12 The administrative law judge explained why she
13 afforded little weight to the contrary opinions by
14 Dr. Seybold and Dr. Calkins, including based on exam findings
15 and activities of daily living. I find that it is adequately
16 explained and the rejection of the sit/stand option is
17 supported by substantial evidence.

18 The fourth argument is a step four challenge and
19 it's dependent on the challenge to the residual functional
20 capacity and I find that, having rejected those arguments,
21 that substantial evidence supports and in particular the
22 vocational expert's testimony supports plaintiff's ability to
23 perform her past relevant work as a hair braider. It's
24 discussed by Administrative Law Judge Koennecke at 1972 to
25 1974, and so I am going to -- I'm sorry, that's the expert

1 testimony. So I'm going to grant judgment on the pleadings
2 to the defendant and order dismissal of plaintiff's
3 complaint. Thank you both, I hope you have a good summer.

4 MR. GORTON: Thank you, your Honor.

5 MS. CARTER: Thank you, your Honor.

6 (Proceedings Adjourned 2:49 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER

I, JODI L. HIBBARD, RPR, CRR, CSR, Federal
Official Realtime Court Reporter, in and for the
United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York, DO HEREBY CERTIFY that
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States.

Dated this 23rd day of July, 2021.

/S/ JODI L. HIBBARD

JODI L. HIBBARD, RPR, CRR, CSR
Official U.S. Court Reporter